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A. TESTATE AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION
N THE ABSENCE of a will, the law of the domicile will govern the
distribution of movables8T5 and the law of the situs will govern the
descent of immovables.17 1 If, therefore, a person domiciled in Wash-
ington dies leaving real and personal property in Washington and real
property in Oregon, the Washington law will govern as to the descent
and distribution of the real and personal property in Washington, but
the Oregon law governs as to the descent and distribution of the real
property in Oregon. Under the Washington law, separately owned real
estate and separately owned personal property descends or is distrib-
uted in accordance with special statutes, applicable thereto."40 With
respect to community property, however, a special statute deals with
the descent and distribution of such community property 88'
Rules of descent and distribution as provided by statute are, how-
*Part I of this article appeared in 22 WASH. L. REv. 155 (1947).
878 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 303 (1934), Rader v. Stubblefield, 43 Wash.
334, 86 Pac. 560 (1906).8 9 RESTATEMENT, ;oNFLicT OF LAws § 245 (1934), see Mace v. Duffy, 39 Wash.
597, 81 Pac. 1053 (1905).
880 REx. REv. STAT. §§ 1341, 1364.
881 Id. § 1342.
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ever, inflexible. Property must go in the manner provided by law
without deviation and without adjustment to the particular need of the
particular beneficiary Thus trusts cannot be established without a
will; provision cannot be made to dispense with an unnecessary admn-
istrator's bond;382 provision cannot be made to simplify the necessary
probate procedure as in the case of nonintervention wills.""8 The ap-
pointment of an administrator cannot be controlled because the statute
must be followed,88 nor can protection be afforded in the absence of a
will against the claims of future creditors, where their claims would
constitute a grave hardship upon beneficiaries. 5
The advantages of testamentary distribution are, therefore, appar-
ent. Not only can the executor be named,8 ' the executor's bond be
dispensed with, the provisions of the nonintervention will statute in-
voked,8 ' but it is also possible to select beneficiaries and to so adjust
the distribution of benefits under the will and the taxes thereon as to
meet needs as they change from time to time as in the case of the
establishment of testamentary trusts. By so doing, the testator also
avoids the risk of changes in law applicable when there is no will. 8
B. METHODS OF AVOIDING PROBATE
Testate succession, as has already been pointed out, need not be
effected solely by medium of a will, although a will is the most effica-
cious way of securing such succession. Other methods have been used,
most of which are highly undesirable. A contract supported by con-
sideration can bring about post mortem benefits in accordance with its
terms; '89 but a contract is not a donative transfer, and it is the dona-
tive transfer that is by far the most important type of testate succes-
sion. Mutual deeds or bills of sale to be effective on death are meffec-
tive from want of delivery in the lifetime of the grantor or trans-
feror." Endorsing stock in blank or leaving bearer securities in a
882 Id. § 1437
888 Id. §§ 1462-4.
$84 Id. § 1431.
885 E.g. Spendthrift trusts, 69 C. J. 697
38 A testator may even appoint a poor executor, but it is his executor. State
ex rel. Lauridsen v. Superior Court 179 Wash. 198, 37 P.(2d) 209 (1934).887 See Bonneville & Lyons, Problems Arising Under Nonintervention Wills, 16
WASH. L. Rav. 195 (1941), Foster, Powers and Duties of Executors and Admins-
trators C.T.A. Under Nonintervention Wills, 16 WASH. L. Rxv. 196 (1941).
888 As to nuncupative wills, see 1 WASH. L. Rv. 61 (1925). See also Shepherd
& Pruyn, Some Federal Tax Aspects of Will Draftsmanship, 25 TAXES 433 (1947).
8 See In re Lewis' Estate, 2 Wn.(2d) 458, 98 P.(2d) 654 (1940).
880 Showalter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 160 Pac. 1042 (1916), Atwood v. Atwood,
15 Wash. 285, 46 Pac. 240 (1896), Eves v. Roberts, 96 Wash. 99, 164 Pac. 915
(1917), Bloor v. Bloor, 105 Wash. 110, 177 Pac. 722 (1919).
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safety deposit box to which both spouses. have access does not effect a
transfer because of want of delivery inter vzvos.39' Even United States
Government bonds or war bonds payable to a beneficiary did not prior
to the enactment of Sess. L. 143, Ch. 14, constitute an effective transfer
by gift9 - and were considered an ineffective testamentary transfer in
this state. Gifts causa mortis may effect a saving in inheritance or estate
tax, 8 but such gifts are outright and their value is limited to cases
where outright gifts are sufficient to meet the situation. The creation
of inter vzvos trusts with remainder interests does have value as part
of an estate plan, but such a method of succession is hardly a substi-
tute for the disposition of the entire estate. No trustor wishes to leave
all of his estate by inter vzvos trust and thereby deprive himself of the
benefits that go with property ownership. Even if the trustor retains
a life income in the property given away in trust, no federal tax
advantage is obtained 9' and the individual assumes the burdens of
trusteeship if he is the trustee, or the restrictions on fiduciary handling
of property if another is named as trustee. Transfers inter vzvos to
take effect in enjoyment or possession at or after death have no tax
advantages.9 ' The execution of an agreement relative to the disposi-
tion of community property as between husband and wife (REM. R:Ev
STAT. of Washington, § 6894) is possible, 8 but the method still leaves
unadjudicated the question of whether the property is in fact com-
munity property and not separate (the agreement is inoperative as to
separate property) and, like all the preceding methods requiring a
delivery inter vzvos, the question as to whether the claims of creditors
of the deceased have been paid or barred by limitations is not adjudi-
cated. 97
s91 See cases in preceding note.
892 REM. REv. STAT. (1943 Supp.) §§ 11548-60, 61, Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash.
549, 92 P.(2d) 254 (1939), Comment, 14 WASH. L. REv. 312 (1939). See Latcham,
Rights of Beneficaries of Government Savtngs Bonds, 18 WASH. L. REv. 162 (1943),
20 WASH. L. REv. 123 (1945), 16 WASH. L. Rnv. 105 (1941). Cf. Moore v. Marshall,
302 Ky. 729, 196 S. W. (2d) 369, 168 A. L. R. 241 (1947). (Second Liberty Loan
bonds held nontransferable.)
393 There is no inheritance or estate tax on the amount of the gift tax which, but
for the gift caua inortis, would be part of the tax base for inheritance or estate
tax purposes.
804 INT. REv. CoDE § 811(c).
95 IxT. REv. CoDE § 811(c), Reg. No. 105 § 81.17
800 The validity of REM. REv. STAT. § 6894 was upheld in McKnight v. McDonald,
34 Wash. 98, 74 Pac. 1060 (1904). For a recent example of such an agreement see
It re Estate of Josephine L. Brown, 129 Wash. Dec. 20, 185 Pac.(2d) 125 (1947).
89 7 In re Collins' Estate, 102 Wash. 697, 173 Pac. 1016 (1918), State ex reL.
Speckart v. Superior Ct., 48 Wash. 141, 92 Pac. 942 (1907). An affidavit is no sub-
stitute. See State ex rel. Mann v. Superior Ct., 52 Wash. 149, 152; 100 Pac. 198
(1909).
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Under these circumstances a will is the person's only assurance that
he can make an effective and thoughtful and economical disposition
of his property upon his death.""8
C. THE DEATH TAX STRUCTURE
1. THE WASHINGTON MIN TANCE TAX
No intelligent estate plan can be devised that does not take into
account the tax structure in the event of death. Let us briefly outline
the situation. Under the Washington law, an inheritance tax is levied
on the privilege of a beneficiary to receive property from a decedent. "'
Property subject to inheritance tax includes tangible or intangible
property, except intangibles of nonresidents dying in the state,"'
devises and bequests, gifts made in contemplation of death or made
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,
by transfer in trust with life enjoyment retained, and the exercise of a
power of appointment. "1 In the case of persons not residents of the
United States or a territory thereof, the tax is also leviable upon cer-
tificates of stock, bonds, bills, notes, bank deposits physically situated
in this state, or when the domicile of the donor is in the state of
Washington.' As to persons domiciled in this state, the tax is leviable
upon all property within the jurisdiction of the state.' It is likewise
leviable upon jointly held property in general (but not entirely) to
the extent owned by the deceased.'0 Proceeds from insurance on the
life of the decedent are taxable although such proceeds up to $40,000
are exempt if the policy or policies of insurance are payable to a per-
son other than the insured's estate.' Likewise, a devise to an executor
in lieu of commissions is taxable to the extent that it exceeds the
898 See Oswald, The Legal Efficacy of Attempted Methods of Avoiding Probate,
5 WASH. L. Ray. 1 (1930).
8 9 9 Re McGrath's Estate, 191 Wash. 496, 505, 71 P.(2d) 395 (1937), Re Henry's
Estate, 189 Wash. 510, 66 P. (2d) 350 (1937), In re Fotheringham's Estate, 183
Wash. 579, 49 P.(2d) 480 (1935). The power of a state to impose an inheritance
tax is not lost by reason of the fact that another state taxes the same property by
reason of an interest therein. See Greenough v. Newport, 67 S. Ct. 1400 (1947),
permitting multiple taxation of intangibles by upholding a statute taxing resident
trustee of foreign trust.
400 REm. REv. STAT. § 11201 (a)
401 Id. §§ 11201, 11201 (a) (c). Formulary credit is given for federal estate tax pur-
poses and full credit for inheritance tax purposes for gift tax paid on gifts includ-
able for estate or inheritance tax purposes. INT. REv. CODE §§ 813(a), 936(b),
REM. REV. STAT. § 11202(b).
402 REm. REv. STAT. § 11202-1 (p).
408 Id. § 11201.
404 Id.
405 Id. § 11211(b).
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reasonable value of such commissions. 408 Charitable and religious gifts,
bequests and transfers are also exempt.""
The rates are relatively low, depending upon the size of the estate
and the relationship to the decedent.' As in the case of the state gift
tax, beneficiaries are divided into three classes: Class A, B, and C.
The rates for Class A beneficiaries start at i per cent of the first
$25,ooo and end with io per cent of all amounts m excess of $500,000.
Class A beneficiaries are given a blanket $5,ooo exemption (including
all allowances in lieu of homestead and family allowances in excess of
$z,ooo) plus $5,000 for the surviving spouse and $5,ooo for each
living child, stepchild or adopted child and $5,ooo for living descend-
ants of a deceased child, stepchild or adopted child per stirpes. If
neither surviving spouse, child, stepchild, adopted child or children of
any of these are living, then an additional $5,ooo Class A exemption is
allowed. The rates for Class B beneficiaries start with 3 per cent of
the first $5,ooo and end with 20 per cent of amounts in excess of
$zoo,ooo. The class exemption is $z,ooo taken from the first $5,ooo
with no individual exemption. Class C rates begin with iO per cent of
the first $zo,ooo and end with 25 per cent of amounts in excess of
$So,ooo. No exemption is allowed for this class or the individual mem-
bers thereof.
All rates are calculated on the net estate received. 09 When the
decedent owns property in and out of the state, all available exemp-
tions are prorated in that proportion that the property within the state
bears to the whole property of the estate. " No exemption is allowed
to a decedent not a resident of a state or territory of the 'United
States.'
In determining the amount of the net estate, there is deducted from
the gross estate debts owing by the decedent at the date of death,
local and state taxes due prior to death, reasonable funeral expenses,
the reasonable cost of a monument or crypt, court costs, including
inheritance tax appraisement, executor's or administrator's fees, rea-
sonable attorney's fees, and family allowance not exceeding $i,ooo."
'
408 Id. § 11207
407 Id. §§ 11218, 11218-1. (Limited for use within Washington unless for.use in a
state exempting the transfer or providing for a reciprocal exemption.)
408 Id § 11202.
400 Id. § 11201.
410 Id. § 11202-1 (m).
411 Id. § 11202-1(p).
12 Id. § 11201. No such limitation as to amount of family allowance exists for.
federal estate tax purposes. Federal administrative practice generally recognizes 15
months payment of family allowance.
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In addition, a credit for federal estate tax, if any paid, is allowed in
ascertaining the taxable net estate.'1 If, however, the total inheritance
tax is less than the credit of 8o per cent of the federal estate tax
allowed by the federal estate tax law, then the total inheritance tax
must be increased to equal such 8o per cent credit.41" Should the estate
be exempt for inheritance tax purposes but subject to the estate tax,
the same result follows."" If the inheritance tax increased as aforesaid
and is later found to exceed the 8o per cent, a refund is due the
estate.'
An additional exemption should be noted. When property passes
from lineal descendents including a stepchild or adopted child who
died within five years prior to the death of the decedent and where
such property now passes from the decedent to any member of the
same class, and such property was taxed under the inheritance tax
laws, the transfer is exempt."TIf its value has meanwhile increased,
the increase is taxable." 8 This exemption applies also to property ex-
changed for what would have been exempt had it still been in exist-
ence, the sum of the exemption not exceeding the value of the property
that would have been exempt but for the exchange." 9
To assure collection of the tax, notice of the estimated value of the
estate and other data must be filed with the State Tax Commission on
the appointment of an executor or adminstrator,' ° and a copy of the
inventory and appraisement filed with the federal government, and any
amendment thereof, if any there be, must likewise be filed with the
State Tax Commission."' Should the values accepted by the personal
representative for federal estate tax purposes exceed those used for
state inheritance tax purposes, the value of the items must be raised
for inheritance tax purposes to the same amount. 2 This does not
mean that if the entire community estate must be included for estate tax
418 Id. § 11201(b).
414 Id. § 11202(b).
"15 Ibid.
1 Ibid.
417 Id. § 11202(a).
418 Ibid.
419 Id. § 11202(a). It should be noted that the net taxable estate (not the gross
estate) on which the inheritance tax has been paid is exempt. In re Letchworth, 201
Cal. 1. 255 Pac. 195 (1927), In re Nilson, 201 Iowa 1033, 204 N. W 244 (1925). The
federal law corresponds under INT. REv. CODE § 812(c). Wilkinson v. C. I. R., 5
T. C. 1246 (1945) Bahr v. C. I. R., 119 F.(2) 371 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
420 REm. REv. STAT. § 11213. Procedure for determination of inheritance tax even
in the absence of probate administration is provided by REm. REv. STAT. § 11216.
421 REM. Ra,. STAT. § 11202(b).
4
2 2 Id. § 11202-1 (1).
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purposes it must likewise be included for inheritance tax purposes.42.
Indeed, despite the 3942 estate tax amendments, the Washington law
remains the same as formerly, namely one-half of the community estate
being subject to inheritance tax.42" ' In addition, the inheritance tax is
a lien upon the property of the estate 25 and is the liability of the per-
sonal representative, who is forbidden to distribute the property until
the inheritance tax has been paid or provision made. 28 The beneficiary
must ultimately pay the tax, and the provision for withholding the
amount thereof before legacy. is distributed is to assure collection by
the state. 27
As to valuation as of date of death of the estate left, provision is
made for appraisement by three appraisers, to be appointed by the
cour 2s and with right of the supervisor to fix a value and determine
the tax after hearing.42' Estates subject to annuities, life estates and
terms for years must be appraised according to statutory formula,8 '
as is also the case in trust or contingent estates subject to defeasance.481
Provision is also made for the valuation of a foreign estate located in
this state and on which an inheritance tax is payable by taking into
account the indebtedness of the entire estate, a proportionate share
of which is deductible in arriving at the net estate located in this
state and on which an inheritance tax is payable.' 2
2. THE PEDEAL ESTATE TAX ATWD MDEAL INCOMIE TAX DUtIES
The federal estate tax is imposed upon the privilege of'transmittifig
property88 rather' than as in the case of the inheritance tax upon the
428 Furthermore, RExs. REv. STAT. § 11202-1 (1) was enacted (WASH. LAWS 1939,
c. 202, § 3) before the 1942 amendments.
44 The tax is on the right to receive. In re Henry's Estate, 189 Wash. 510, 66
P.(2d) 350 (1937), Re Fothenngham's Estate, 183 Wash. 579, 49 P.(2d) 480
(1935). Cf. Lang v. Com., 304 U. S. 264 (1938).
425 REm. REv. STAT. §§ 11208, 11201.
426 Id. § 11202-1(n) (o). WAS LAWS 1947, c. 21.
427 Id. §§ 11208, 11209.
428Id. § 1465. Griffiths v. State, 128 Wash. Dec. 364, 183 P.(2d) 821 (1947).
Cf. value of property set aside in lieu of homestead which is as of date of petition,
not date of death. Re Estate of Majka, 128 Wash. Dec. 205, 206, 182 P (2d) 15
(1947).
429 RE . REv. STAT. § 11202-1 (a-k). Provision is also made for determination of
inheritance tax where there is no probate administration. REM. REv. STAT. § 11216.
480 Id. § 11205. A remainder is taxable as of date of death, even if it may be
ultimately defeated by exercise of trustee's power to invade the corpus. Ivy's Estate,
4 Wn.(2d) 1, 101 P.(2d) 1074 (1940).
481 REM. REv. STAT. § 11206. For an application of this statute, see Re Water-
man's Estate, 173 Wash. 101, 22 P.(2d) 53 (1933).
482 REM. REv. STAT. § 11204.
43
8 In re McGrath's Estate, 191 Wash. 496, 505; 71 P.(2d) 395 (1937).
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privilege of receiving property "I Accordingly, that tax is assessed on
the entire net estate without regard to benefits left or relationship of
the recipients to the testator. It applies to the entire net estate of a
citizen, wherever resident, or a resident regardless of nationality or
citizenship, exclusive of real estate outside the United States.'
The gross estate includes the decedent's interest in real and personal
property except realty outside the United States, dower, curtesy or
similar interest of a surviving spouse, transfers in contemplation of
death or to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,
interests held in jointly owned or community property, 83 a property
passing under power of appointment, and insurance receivable by
executors and others with certain exceptions."8'
The net estate is determined by deducting from the gross estate
funeral expenses, 3 administration expenses,"' claims against the estate
duly allowed by law, unpaid mortgages, amounts expended for the
support of dependents as allowed by local laws (including family
allowance), ' all limited by the amount of property subject to general
claims, losses incurred during the settlement of an estate through casu-
alty or theft not compensated by insurance, property previously taxed
34 In re Henry's Estate, 189 Wash. 510, 66 P.(2d) 350 (1937), Re Fothering-
ham's Estate, 183 Wash. 579, 49 P.(2d) 480 (1935).
485 INT. REv. CODE §§ 802, 810, 935.
4835a See note 543 tnfra.
4 8 INT. REv. CODE § 811. National Service life insurance proceeds are includable
in gross estate, but estate tax payment can be enforced only from the other property
of the estate (Bureau of Int. Rev. Letter Ruling, Mar. 14, 1946). The "Report of
the Special Tax Study Committee to the Committee on Ways and Means" recom-
mends that the interests of employees in pension plans qualified under INT. REv.
CODE § 165 should be excluded from the operation of estate and gift taxes. 25 TAXES
1049 (1947)
437 As to deductibility of perpetual care of graves, see Gillespie v. C. I. R., 8
T. C. 93 (1947), Inglehart, 77 F.(2d) 704 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), Cardeza, 5 T. C.
202 (1945).
438 See Lang's Estate v. C. I. R. 97 F.(2d) 867 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) applying
Washington law prior to 1942 estate tax amendments. The same rule has been ap-
plied with reference to community property in Texas. Schuhmacher v. C. I. R. 8
T. C. 56 (1947). Since the 1942 Amendments the federal administrative practice is
to permit deduction of probate administration expenses from the gross estate in
proportion to the community property includable for estate tax purposes. Attorneys'
fees incurred after estate tax return is filed are deductible if at the time of the
return they cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy. Cf. Cleveland v. Hig-
gins, 148 F.(2d) 722 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1945) cert. den. 326 U. S. 722 (1945), Moir v.
United States, 149 F 2d) 455 (C. C. A. 1st, 1945). Executor's fees paid are deduc-
tible regardless of reasonableness. Freed v. C. I. R. 6 T. C. M. Dec. 15, 656 (M.).
See 25 Taxes 1049 (1947) dealing with deductibility of administration expenses paid
by persons other than personal representative.
439 No deduction permitted for a widower not a dependent. Est. of Jacobs v.
C. I. R., 8 T. C. 115 (1947). 33 A. B. A. J. 1062.
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under the five-year rule,40 and transfers for public,. charitable and
religious uses."" From the net estate is also deducted a $ioo,ooo ex-
emption under the basic or 1926 Revenue Act"2 and an exemption of
$6o,ooo under the additional or 1932 Revenue Act as amended." 8
The estate property is valued by the executor, subject to federal
audit, no formal appraisement being required."' Valuation is as of the
date of death,"' although, at the option of the personal representa-
tive, the date may be fixed at one year after the date of death."6
The rates are basic on the net estate after all exemptions."' The
basic estate rates are from one to 20 per cent. The additional estate
tax is the excess of the tax computed at the additional tax rates over
the basic tax. The additional rates are from three to seventy-seven
per cent after allowing the $6o,ooo exemption. Credits are allowed for
payments made under the federal gift tax statute as to any property
includable for estate tax purposes and on which a federal gift tax has
been paid., 8
To insure collection, the personal representative must file a prelinu-
nary notice with.the Collector of Internal Revenue within the district
of the decedent's esidence within two months after decedent's death,
40 IT. Rav. CoDE §§ 812(c), 861 (a) (2). The five-year exemption has its short-
comings. See Wilkenson, 5 T. C. 149 (1945), Ramsbottom, 148 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A.
6th, 1945). See note 419, supra.
461 INT. REv. CODE §§ 812(d), 861 (a) (3). Conditional charitable devises unless
the condition is negligible are not exempt; Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.46; Win.. H.
Churchill Jr. v. U. S., 68 F Supp. 267 (1946), U. S. v. Fourth, National'Bank,
83 F.(2d) 85 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936), Pennsylvania Co. v. Brown, Collector, 70
F.(2d) 269 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934). The creation of'a charitable remainder is not an
uncommon method of reducing federal estate and state inheritance taxes for the
benefit of the life tenant. See also, Edward Ortoir Jr. Ceramic Foundation et al. v.
C. I. R., 9 T. C. 73 (1947), involving income tax exemption under INT. Rnv.
CODE § 101(6) even though charity was required to pay an annuity to the testator's
widow. See "Report of the Special Tax Study Committee to the Committee on
Ways and Means" dealing with charitable bequests -(Dec. 1947). .25 TAXES 1049
(1947).
"42 INT. REv. CoDE § 812.
448 Id. § 935.
4 Id. § 864, 821. On valuing unlisted shares of a closely held corporation; see
Estate of Cruikshank, 9 T. C. 23 (1947), DuPuy v. C. I. R., 9 T. C. 43, (1947)
(less than book value).
4d5 INT. Rav. CODE § 811.
446id. § 811(j). The exercise of this option -effects tax savings if the estate
has substantially decreased in value during the year. However, property, sold or
distributed within the year after death is valued as of the date of sale or distribu-
tion, and property the value of which is "affected by the mere lapse of time" is
valued as of the date of death, with an adjustment for any difference in its value
(on the optional date) not due to lapse of time. See Welliver, 8 T. C. 18 (1947).
The option must be elected upon the tax return properly filed -within fifteen months
of death. Capital gain or loss holding period (INT. REv. CODE § 117) nevertheless
begins with date of death. Spec. Rul., Oct. 18, 1946, I. T :P .T .2 D.R2.
447 INT. REv. CDE §§ 810, 935.
448 Id. §§ 936, 813. See Note 268, supra.
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or within two months after such representative qualifies."91 A complete
estate tax return must be filed by the personal representative with the
Collector within fifteen months after the death of the decedent. 450 The
tax is then payable, 5 unless the time is extended for reasons of undue
hardship."' Until paid, the tax is a lien " and various statutory reme-
dies are available -for its collection.4"k
The collection of the tax liability of the deceased and of the estate
is carefully safeguarded. Attention has already been called to the pre-
liminary notices and final returns for inheritance and estate tax pur-
poses. Income tax liability is also involved. Thus the personal repre-
sentative of the estate must file an income tax return on Form 1040
for the decedent on or before the fifteenth day of the third full cal-
endar month following the close of the taxable year unless extended. 5 '
The estate whose gross income on a calendar or fiscal year basis is
$500 per annum or over must file an income tax return on Form
1041,"1" and if its gross income is $5,ooo or over, a sworn copy of the
last will of the deceased must be attached if it has not been attached
before.5" Although estates are not subject to the Current Tax Payment
Act, the estate may elect to pay its tax in four quarterly installments
beginning on the due date of the return.' The executor or adminis-
449 26 U. S. C. A. § 820.
45 0 INT. REv. CODE §§ 821, 864. Failure to file tax return on time may result in the
imposition of a 25 per cent penalty. See Estate of Werbelovsky, 9 T. C. 93 (1947).
4
5 1 INT. Rv. CODE§ 822(a) (1).
452Id. § 822(a) (2). Undue hardship does not mean mere inconvenience. An
extension of three months may be given interest-free and thereafter at the rate
of 4 per cent per annum. INT. Rnv. CODE § 890(a). No single extension can be granted
for more than one year, with total maximum extensions of ten years. If the tax is
not paid within fifteen months from date of death and no extension is granted,
interest at 6 per cent per annum is payable, beginning with fifteen months from
date of death. I T. REv. CODE § 893(a). Such interest is chargeable to the income
beneficiary of the testamentary trust. Behl, 7 T. C. 168 (1946). The "Report of the
Special Tax Study Committee to the Committee on Ways and Means" recommends
legislation permitting payment of federal estate tax over a period of ten years
provided that interest at 3 percent per annum from a date following the date of
death by twenty-four months be paid on and with each installment. It further
recommends that the federal government offer noninterest bearing, nontransferable,
special obligations redeemable at par on sixty days' notice and acceptable at par
in payment of federal estate taxes. Such bonds in the amount of the tax up to
$50,000 would be free of estate tax and if tax is greater, then not to exceed 50
per cent of the tax or $50,000, whichever is greater. 25 TAXES 1049 (1947).
45 3 INT. REv. CODE § 827
454Id. § 826.
455 Reg. No. 111 § 29.53-1, as amended T. D. 5396. As to whether particular
income should be included in decedent's or estate's return, see e.g. Estate of Basch
v. C. I. R., 9 T. C. 88 (1947).
45 INT. REv. CODE § 142(a), Reg. No. 111 § 29.142-6. Cf. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 163,
147
4'5d. § 142(a), Reg. No. 111 § 29.142-1(c).
5 8 INT. REv. CoDE §§56(b), 58(a).
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trator is personally liable for the tax if, prior to discharge, he knew
or should have known thereof."" Lien statutes," 0 transferee liability
provisions""' and many other statutes"2 further insure collection.
During the pendency of the probate, all community income and the
decedent's separate income is reportable solely by the estate as a sepa-
rate taxable entity,"8 with an annual exemption of $5oo.' 04 The widow
cannot split what would otherwise have been community income as
hers""5 and is subject to the Current Tax Payment Act with respect
thereto.' The widow's allowance is probably not taxable income to
the widow '" A final income tax return must be filed by the estate on
or before the fifteenth day of the third full calendar month after the
estate is closed."' For taxable years commencing with 1942, the residu-
45 Irving Trust Co., 36 B. T. A. 146 (1937). 31 U. S. C. A. § 192, Reg. No. 111,
§ 29.162-1. The statute refers to the payment of "debts" but has been held applicable
to the payment of legacies as well. Wright, 28 B. T. A. 543 (1933). Morris, 36
B. T. A. 516 (1937). The statute is inapplicable if the obligations paid, such as
administration expenses and widow's allowance, had priority over the tax. Union
Guardian Trust Co., 41 B. T. A. 1306 (1940). Smith, 24 B. T. A. 807 (1931).
400 26 U. S. C. A. § 3670, et seq.
481INT. REv. CODE § 311(a) (1), Rablan & Johnson, p. 4021, § P2(5), et Seq.
Munroe, 65 F Supp. 213 (1940), holding distributee liable for decedent's unpaid
federal income tax liability.
462 E.g. 26 U. S. C. A. § 3690 (distraint).
408 C. I. R. v. Larson, 131 F.(2d) 85 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), Bishop v. C. I. R.,
4 T. C. 862 (1945). As to when the estate is settled for income tax purposes, see
Chick, 7 T. C. 1414 (1946), Estate of Armstrong, 2 T. C. 731 (1943). Deductions
for income tax purposes under INT. REV. CODE § 23 (§ 162) are not deductible for
estate tax purposes under § 811(b) except to limited extent under § 23-w (§ 162-e).
Payments made to estate of deceased employee for unpaid compensation are not
wages for withholding tax purposes. Spec. Rul., Sept. 18, 1946,. reconsidering I. T.
No. 3737
464 INT. REV. CODE § 163.
465 C. I. R. v. Larson, 131 F.(2d) 85 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) (Wash.), Barbour v.
C. I. R., 89 F(2d) 474 (C C. A. 5th, 1937) (Texas). The income is no longer com-
munity income as it was in Washington when the marital community existed prior to
dissolution by death. However, the rule in California requires the widow to split
"community income" during probate administration. Bishop v. C. I. R., 152 F. (2d)
389 (C. C. A. 9th, 1945). G. C. M. 25008, 1946-20-12410. The same is the rule in An-
zona (I. T. No. 3841, 19474-12490), and Louisiana, Henderson's Estate v. C. I. R.
155 F.(2d) 310 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946), and Idaho (I. T. 3861, I. R. B. 1947-16). If, how-
ever, part of the estate is distributed to her durig probate, she would have to pay
an income tax on the income from such distributed property. This might reduce the
total income tax. See Hale v. Anglim, 140 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944), C. I. R.
v. Crawford's Estate, 139 F.(2d) 616 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1943). Estate income is not
currently distributable to devisees so as to entitle the estate to income tax credit
where local law permits distribution only in the court's discretion. Estate of Cohen
v. C. I. R., 8 T. C. 87 (1947).
400 27 STAT. 126. For a discussion of whether income from business involving
personal services and separate capital is community or separate, see LeSourd, 22
WAsH. L. REv. 19 (1947).
46
7 See Rablan & Johnson, p. 3227, § G 4(4).
408As a return for a fractional year. INT. REv. CODE § 47(b), Reg. No. 111
§ 29.53-1(2).
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ary legatee is taxable on the income of the estate for the taxable year
in which the residuary legacy is paid over to him and it does not
matter if for local law purposes the income is treated as principal., 9
D. TESTAMENTARY PLANNING
1. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
In the simplest type of testamentary disposition each spouse makes
a will at the same time, appointing the other (and an alternate) as
executor, to serve without bond, under a nonintervention will. The
estate is left to the surviving spouse, and if the spouse is not living, or
dies at the same or substantially the same time as the testator, then
the property is left outright to child or children, share and share alike,
per stirpes, or to others. If specific legacies are left, or life insurance
proceeds left, provision may also be made to make the payment of
these free of inheritance or other succession tax. Occasionally the
spouses name a testamentary guardian for minor child or children in
the event of the death of both spouses.
It is not always desirable, however, to leave a lump sum estate to a
surviving spouse who may be inexperienced in business matters or
even to a child, especially a minor child. Provision must then be made
for the payment of periodic income from date of death to such bene-
ficiaries with provision for invading the corpus or accumulated income
in case of need. This can be best accomplished through the medium of
a testamentary trust or trusts, naming a competent fiduciary to act
with or without the surviving spouse and with very broad powers.
There is an inheritance and estate tax advantage in the use of the tes-
tamentary trust providing a life estate with remainders over, because
upon the death of the life tenant the remainder falls into possession
of the remainderman free of estate or inheritance tax.4' ° This tax
advantage would not exist if the property were left outright to the
surviving spouse and then, by the surviving spouse left to the child or
children of the spouse, nor would an estate tax advantage exist if the
property were left not in trust but to the surviving spouse for life with
469 Re Carlisle, 8 T. C. 66 (1947). Prior to 1942 amendment to INT. REv. CODE
§ 162(b) the rule was otherwise. Durkheimer, 41 B. T. A. 585 (1940).
470 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION, 179 § 403, Royce v. C. I. R., 46
B. T. A. 1090 (1942), INT. Rxv. CODE § 811(a), Reg. No. 105, § 81-13, Davis v.
U. S., 27 F Supp. 698 (1939), Frew v. Bowers, 12 F.(2) 625 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926).
See Porter v. Wheeler, 131 Wash. 482, 230 Pac. 640 (1924) , In re Eckert's Estate,
14 Wash (2d) 497, 128 Pac.(2d) 656 (1942), Re Goochnour's Estate, 192 Wash. 92.
72 P.(2d) 1027 (1937).
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power to consume the estate,"" the balance remaining upon the
spouse's death to go to the children. Such a disposition is a taxable
power of appointment for federal estate tax purposes,' although not
for inheritance tax purposes.' 8 There would accordingly still be the
inheritance tax saving even in the latter type of disposition where no
trust is used for the benefit of the life tenant and remainderman.
In any well-planned testamentary trust the payments to be made by
the trustee should be integrated with payments to come from other
sources such as life insurance and income from the separate estate of
the surviving spouse. It is, therefore, possible to make provision that
the total income to be paid by the testamentary trustee shall not
exceed a definite amount after taking into account income receivable
by the surviving spouse from all other sources, or it may be provided
that the trustee shall not take into account insurance proceeds payable
to the surviving spouse or shall not take into account the income from
separate property The whole matter can be regulated in a very flexible
manner.
Again, it may be desirable to insert a spendthrift clause to protect
the testamentary beneficiaries or any part of them, such as minor
beneficiaries.' Provision should also be made for a competent fiduci-
ary and one financially responsible such as a corporate trustee or a
corporate trustee to serve as a co-trustee with the surviving spouse, 75
with provisions for alternates and provisions for resignation.
There are two problems, however, that should be noticed at this
point in greater detail-the problem of the duration of the trust and
the problem of leaving the designation of beneficiaries to a named
beneficiary in the trust.
471 Illustrations of such a power will be found in Porter v. Wheeler, 131 Wash.
482, 230 Pac. 640 (1924), It re Eckert's Estate, 14 Wn.(2d) 497, 128 P.(2d) 656
(1942), Re Goochnour's Estate, 192 Wash. 92, 72 P. (2d) 1027 (1937).
472 REv. AcT 1942, § 811(f) (2) (A) (B), Reg. No. 105 § 81.24.
There is no Washington statute corresponding to the federal statute definng
power of appointment. R!m. REv. STAT. § 11201(c) taxes the exercise of a power
of appointment the definition of which is left to the common law.
474 Annotation, 138 A. L. R. 1319; 119 A. L. R. 78. GRisWoLD, SPE THRIF
TRUSTS (1936), RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 152 (1935), NOSSAMAN, TRUST ADMINIS-
TRATION AND TAXATION 341, § 353 (1945).
475 When a surviving spouse is both trustee and beneficiary with power to invade
the corpus, care should be taken so as to guard against such power constituting
a taxable power of appointment (1) by depriving her of the right to vote on whether
power to invade corpus should be exercised (2) by giving other trustee absolute
power with respect thereto subject to no conditions and taking away the right of
judicial review with respect thereto (3) as precautionary measure limiting the
annual amount that can be taken from corpus so as to limit the value of the
claimed "power of appointment."
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
With respect to the first problem, there is immediately encountered
the rule against perpetuities and the rule against accumulations. At
common law, the vesting of a future interest could not be postponed
beyond a life or lives in being, plus twenty-one years, and the period
of gestation.' The purpose of this rule was to prevent the tying up
of estates for excessive periods and to compel the use of estates within
a reasonable period of time. Thus, if a father died leaving a child sur-
viving, he could postpone the vesting of the estate for the lifetime of
the child, plus twenty-one years and the period of gestation following
the death of his child, this meant, in effect, that a father could post-
pone the vesting of an interest until his grandchild became of age. If,
however, the interest did not vest for a period beyond the permitted
period, then the whole provision became null and void."' The rule
against perpetuities was not, however, directed against a postponement
of possession, use and enjoyment;"" it was directed solely against the
postponement of the period of vesting.
Frequently it is a difficult matter to determine whether a perpetuity
period is being exceeded in the creation of a future interest in a testa-
mentary trust. It is, therefore, desirable as a matter of precaution to
affirmatively provide that if any future interest created by the trust
violates the rule against perpetuities, the provision should not on that
account be void but that the perpetuity period should end at or one
day before the end of such period, the property then to vest in the
person enjoying the use of the property at that time.
A related rule is the common law rule against accumulations. At
common law the trustee could be directed to accumulate and retain the
trust estate during the perpetuity period.' By the Thelluson Act (39
and 4o Geo. III, Chapter 98, enacted in the year I8oo), the permis-
sible period was cut down to the life of the settler or twenty-one years
after his death or during designated minorities. There is no Wash-
47 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPErUiTiES (4th ed.) §§ 201, 222, 2 SIMEs, FUTURE
INTERESTS § 479, et seq., Thomas v. Pullman Trust & Say. Bank, 371 Ill. 577 21
N. E.(2d) 897 (1939), NOSSAMAN, op. cit. supra, note 474, § 65 et seq.
477 Knox v. Jones, 47 N. Y. 389 (1872), Courtier v. Oram, 21 Beav. 91, 52
Reprint 793, Bank of California v. Ager, 7 Wash.(2d) 179, 109 Pac. (2d) 548
(1941).
478 Denny v. Hyland, 162 Wash. 68, 297 Pac. 1083 (1931), State ex rel. Everett
T. & S. Bank v. Pac. Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wash.(2d) 844, 157 Pac.(2d) 707, 159
A. L. R. 297 (1945). In re Galland's Estate, 103 Wash. 106, 173 Pac. 740 (1918),
dealing with a charitable trust.479 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030, 1 Eng. Rul. Cas.
498 (H. L. 1805). See Annotation, 152 A. L. R. 657
ESTATE PLANNING
ington statute on the subject, however, so that presumably the com-
mon law rule still applies.48°
The second problem above referred to raises the question of power
of appointment. A testator is not always in a position to make an
intelligent forecast of how his or her property should go upon the
death of his spouse or child. In such case he may wish to leave the
decision to such surviving spouse in light of the circumstances as they
would be known to her many years hence. If so, this can be done by
granting to his surviving spouse, or other person, the power to make
this decision. Such a power is known as a power of appointment.81
Certain tax consequences should, however, be considered in connection
with a power of appointment.
Under the Washington law, when a resident donee of a power of
appointment exercises it, the appointed property is subject to inherit-
ance tax as if the property were inherited from the donee of such
power. If at the time the appointment takes effect the donor is a resi-
dent, but the donee is a nonresident, the appointed property is deemed
inherited from the donor of such power. 8'
Although there is no express statutory provision under the Washing-
ton law dealing with state gift tax liability in the case of powers of
appointment, the broad sweep of the gift tax statute would undoubt-
edly result in taxing the exercise of a power of appointment, general
or special, in favor of a person other than the donor of the power.
Indeed, the statute may be broad enough to tax the donee of an unexer-
cised power if the donee has the power to exercise the power of ap-
pointment in his favor or for his benefit.
8
1
With respect to the federal tax law, the statute is as follows: Prior
to October 21, 1942, the federal estate tax and the federal gift tax
were imposed on the exercise of general powers of appointment. Gen-
eral powers unexercised and special powers, whether exercised or not,
were not taxed.'8 ' Under the 1942 Act, property with respect to which
a decedent had a power of appointment is included for estate tax
purposes whether the power is general or special and whether or not
exercised, unless exercisable in favor of certain relatives, namely, the
480 Rnm. REv. STAT. § 143, Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 284 Pac. 343 (1930),
68 A. L. P. 254.4 8 1 
RTAEMENT, PROPETY § 318 (1944).
482 R . Rav. STAT. § 11201(c).
488 Id. § 11218-11.
-'1"See Griswold and Leach, Powers of Appotntment and the Federal Estate
Tax, 52 HAv. L. Rnv. 929 (1929), NOSSAMAN, op. cit. supra, note 474, § 640.
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spouse of the decedent, the spouse of the creator of the power, descend-
ants of the donee of the power or his spouse, descendants (other than
donee) of the grantor of the power or his spouse, and spouses of such
descendants. There is excluded, however, from taxable powers of
appointment powers for charitable and public uses and a power to
appoint within a restricted class if the decedent did not receive any
beneficial interest in the property and the power is not exercisable in
his favor or for his benefit. 8
The 1942 amendments do not apply, however, to special powers not
exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate, or his creditors created
on or before and not exercised after October 21, 1942.88 Nor do the
amendments apply to general powers created on or before October 2 1,
x942 if the donee on October 21, 1942 was under legal disability to
release the power. He has six months after the termination of the dis-
ability to effect such release. Service in the armed forces "until tern-
nation of the present war" is a disability ' 7 The 1942 amendments do
not apply to powers existing on October 21, 1942 if released before
July i, I948."' However, the exercise or release of a power of ap-
pointment in contemplation of death, or if intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death, renders the appointed
property taxable.'89 If the disposition is one under which the donee
retains for his life the possession or enjoyment of or the right to
income from property appointed, the property is taxable. 90 Dispo-
sitions for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth are not taxable.' 9'
In addition to federal estate tax liability, the 1942 amendments
make a corresponding change in the federal gift tax law applicable
with respect to powers of appointment. Generally, what is taxable for
estate tax purposes is, in the case of inter vivos created powers of
appointment, taxable for gift tax purposes.'
In connection with this matter of powers of appointment, it should
485 INT. REv. CODE § 811(f) , Reg. No. 105, § 81.24.
486 REv. Acr 1942 § 403(d) (1).
487Id. § 403(d) (2), INT. REV. CODE § 3797(a) (15).
488 INT. REv. CODE § 811(f), Reg. No. 105 § 81.24(3). H. J. Res. 210 extending
the time to July 1, 1948 was approved by the President June 25, 1947 and is desig-
nated Pub. Law 112 80th Cong. See C. C. H., FEn. ESTATE AND Gir TAX REP.
§§ 3460A, 34601, 3925, 3925A.
489 IT. REv. CODE § 811(f), Reg. No. 105 § 81.24(3).
490 1id.
491 bM.
492 INT. REV. CODE § 1000 amended by 1942 REv. AcT § 452a, Reg. No. 108
§ 86.2(b).
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be pointed out that unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will,
the recipient of the power is liable to the executor for a proportionate
share of the estate tax where such property was included in the dece-
dent's estate by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a
power of appointment.
9 3
There are other rules which must be borne in mind in connection
with this subject, but enough has here been stated to call attention to
the problem involved.
The point that is a source of frequent concern, however, is whether
the power to invade corpus by a trustee beneficiary or beneficiaries
constitutes a taxable power of appointment. The regulations say that
it does.'9 Consequently, in any carefully drafted instrument, provision
will be made that the power to invade the corpus should be vested
solely in the trustee and that the beneficiary if at the time acting as
co-trustee shall be disqualified from voting on making such additional
benefits available.' Frequently provision is made that the power to
invade the corpus shall be invoked under certain named conditions
such as illness or misfortune. In such cases, if the trustee did not
invoke its discretionary power when the conditions therefor existed,
the beneficiary could bring a suit to compel the trustee to make a dis-
tribution out of corpus."8' It has been suggested that the power of the
beneficiary to bring such a suit is in substance a right in the beneficiary
to invade corpus and that, therefore, a taxable power of appointment
exists in favor of such beneficiary 117 If this result is to be avoided, it
should be provided that the trustee's discretion should be absolute
without right of judicial review and that the power of the trustee alone
to invade the corpus should be without restriction or condition. It
might also be provided as a matter of precaution that only a stated
maximum amount can be obtained from the corpus in any one year.
In such case, in the event that the other provisions should prove in-
effectual to eliminate a taxable power of appointment, the liability on
that account would be limited. 98
-18 INT. REv. CODE § 826(d).
49- Reg. No. 105 § 81.24(b) (1).
4915 See Looker, Estate and Gift Taxation of Trustees Powers to Distribute Prot-
cipal, COL. L. Ray. 60 (1945). IT has been held that a trustee beneficiary is disqualified
from voting on the distribution of additional principal to him. Rogers v. Rogers,
111 N. Y. 228, 18 N. E. 636 (1888).
498 Estate of Van Deusen, 77 A. C. A. (Cal. App.) 495.
497 See Toeller v. C. I. R., 6 T. C. 832 (1946).
498 Bankers Trust Co. v. Higgins, 136 F. (2) 477 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943). See Mont-
gomery, Jr., Standard Claueses for Wills and Truests, TRuSTS AND ESTATES, 462
(1946), Tractman, Use of Principal for Life Beneficiartes, TRUSTS AND ESTATES
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It is a common provision where there are reciprocal trusts by hus-
band and wife for a wife to name her husband as trustee, giving her
husband power to invade the corpus. In such case, however, the hus-
band obtains a taxable power of appointment. 9 ' It would be better to
name a co-trustee with the husband, giving the co-trustee the sole and
unlimited discretion to invade the corpus without right of judicial
review as in the illustration above given. " '
2. RETAINING UNITARY MANAGEMENT OF MARITAL PROPERTY FOLLOWING
DEATH OF A SPOUSE
a. INTRODUCTORY
The Washington community property system, m which each spouse
has a present vested interest in one-half of the community property,
creates special problems in estate planning when it is sought to pre-
serve the community estate as a whole under a system of unitary man-
agement prevailing in the lifetime of the husband. In view of the fact
that each spouse has free testamentary disposition of his or her half
of the community estate it is possible for the husband to will his one-
half to one set of beneficiaries, whether in trust or otherwise, and
under one system of management, and the wife to will her one-half
under an entirely different system of management and to beneficiaries
wholly of her own choosing. Obviously if the spouses do not agree
upon a common plan with respect to their estates, the benefits of uni-
tary management which prevailed during the lifetime of the spouses
are either dissipated or lost. Self-interest of the spouses, therefore,
have freqently dictated a consideration of how the benefits of com-
munity property management may continue even though the death of
the husband has put an end to the right of unitary management of
community property It is to a consideration of how this problem may
be met that discussion is now directed.
b. METHODS
Fundamentally, there are four methods by which unitary manage-
ment may be continued despite the death of the husband. These meth-
ods have variations, but fundamentally each, though different, has
458 (1946). However, if there is a charitable remainder otherwise deductible for
estate tax purposes, the inclusion of provisions giving a trustee the unrestricted
right to invade the corpus for the benefit of the life tenant will defeat the deduc-
tion because its amount is not ascertainable. Newton Trust Company v. C. I. R., 160
F.(2d) 175 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947)
499 Reg. No. 105, § 81.24(b) (1).
80 See Note 498, supra. For suggested testamentary clauses in general, see
Shepherd & Pruyn, Sone Federal Tax Aspects of Will Draftsmanship, Note 1,
supra.
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definite recognizable features. Briefly summarized at this point they
are as follows:
PLAN A. The husband and wife each leave their respective com-
munity estates in trust. The husband names his wife and another
(such as a bank) co-trustees. The trust is to provide the wife with a
life income, fixing a definite amount to come from the principal if the
income is insufficient. Upon the death of the wife, the trust benefits
are to go to the children. The wife names her husband as trustee; upon
his death, the successor trustee is the trustee named by the husband
in his will to act as co-trustee with his wife-such as the bank. The
trust is to provide an income to the husband for life with a right to
invade the corpus, and then, upon his death, the property is to go to
the children, in trust or outright. In addition, the husband and wife
enter into an agreement whereby, in consideration of the execution of
their respective wills and their mutual agreement not to revoke the
same during their joint lifetime or during their whole lifetime, the
wife agrees to admnister her half of the community estate in the same
manner as the husband's half is administered by his trustee.101 Some-
times under this plan the wife will agree not to spend from her half
of the community estate any sum other than the amount payable under
her husband's trust.
PLAN B. The husband and wife each leave one-half of the commu-
nity estate in trust as in Plan A. At the same time, the husband and
wife enter into a written agreement by which the wife agrees that upon
the husband's death she will transfer her half interest in the com-
munity estate to the trustees named in her husband's will, the, prop-
erty so transferred to be administered as part of that trust estate. A
variation of this plan is to make the transfer optional instead of
mandatory
PLAN C. The husband by will leaves all of his property, including
the community estate of himself and his wife, in trust as in Plan A.
The wife by will leaves her community interest in trust as in Plan A.
At the same time the wife executes a written election to take under
her husband's will, relinquishing her interest in community property
effective on his death. The whole plan is accompanied by an agreement
not to revoke any of the instruments.
501 Mere fact that both wills are executed at same time and that both testators
were present at time of execution and knew the contents of each other's wills does
not necessarily establish they acted pursuant to agreement. McGinn v. Gilroy, 165
P.(2d) 73 (1946) (Ore.).
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PLAN D The husband and wife each by will leave their community
estates in trust as in Plan A. At the same time the wife creates an
rter vzvos trust naming her husband as trustee and, as successor, the
trustee named in his will. The parties agree not to revoke their re-
spective wills.
The above four fundamental plans may be varied as to detail, but
each plan is characteristically different and involves certain differences
in their tax and practical consequences.
c. EVALUATION OF METHODS
Under Plan A, if the husband dies first the tax consequences will
be as follows: (i) The wife may be required to pay a federal estate
tax on the entire estate by virtue of the 1942 amendments;5"2 (2) the
wife and other beneficiaries will have to pay a Washington inheritance
tax upon half of the estate;50o (3) the income tax liabilities will be the
same, namely, the estate paying the income tax during the period of
probate,"°" the trustee paying an income tax after the trust estate
becomes operative,' 5 and the wife paying an income tax on the income
she receives both from the trust and from the one-half community
estate which she owns."' The practical consequences are as follows:
By way of advantage, (i) unity of administration is preserved because
the wife in her capacity as owner of one-half of the community estate
undoubtedly would manage that one-half in the same way that she
and the other trustee will manage the husband's half as trustee under
the husband's will. Furthermore, the community estate is preserved in
view of the unitary management, the estate to go under the husband's
will and the wife's estate to go under her will, under a plan which has
theretofore been approved by the husband and under an agreement
making her will irrevocable; (2) if no such irrevocable agreement
exists, from the wife's standpoint the advantage is that she retains her
right to make testamentary disposition of her one-half in light of con-
ditions as they exist following her husband's death. By way of disad-
vantage, (i) if the wife does not work with the trustee, it is difficult
502 REV. AcT 1942 § 402, INT. REv. CODE § 811(e) (2).
50 REM. REv. STAT. § 11201, Re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 386, 81 P.(2d)
283 (1938), Lang v. C. I. R., 304 U. S. 26 (1938).
504 C. I. R. v. Larson, 131 F.(2d) 85 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), Bishop v. C. I. R.,
4 T C. 588 (1945).
505 Like any other legatee or heir after acquiring income producing assets from
the personal representative of the estate. Fiduciary returns on Form 1041 required
as to distribution of $500 or more. INT. REv. CODE § 147, Reg. No. 111, § 29.147-1.
See, in general, 2 NOSSAMAN, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION 191, § 680.
508 See Note 465, supra.
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to enforce the agreement for unitary management, even if the power
so to do is given to the other trustee. Things can get quite disagreeable
even though a legal remedy to compel performance exists; (2) further-
more, unless there is irrevocable agreement, the wife may prove im-
provident with her one-half interest during her lifetime or unwise in
the testamentary disposition she makes of her one-half interest.
Under Plan A, if the wife dies first the tax consequences will be as
follows: (i) The husband will be required to pay a federal estate tax
on at least one-half of the community estate under the 1942 amend-
ments; 10 (2) he and the other beneficiaries will pay a Washington
inheritance tax upon one-half of the community estate; 08 (3) the
income tax liability will be the conventional one: first, the estate will
pay the income tax during the period of probate; then the trust will
pay an income tax; and the husband will pay an income tax on his
income from his one-half interest in the community estate. The prac-
tical consequences are as follows: By way of advantage, (i) unity of
administration is preserved because the husband as executor and trus-
tee will undoubtedly manage the trust estate in the same way that he
manages his individual half interest; (2) the estate is preserved
because of unitary management and the beneficiaries of that estate
under an irrevocable will agreement will be as desired by both hus-
band and wife during their lifetime; (3) if there is no irrevocable
agreement, the husband will retain his half subject to testamentary
disposition in light of changed conditions following Ins wife's death.
By way of disadvantage, (i) in the absence of an irrevocable agree-
ment, the husband may prove to be improvident in his use of his
one-half of the community estate either in his lifetime or by virtue of
testamentary disposition.
Under Plan B, if the husband dies first the tax consequences will be
as follows: (i) The executor may be required to pay a federal estate
tax on the entire estate under the 1942 amendment; "1 (2) the wife
and other beneficiaries will be required to pay an inheritance tax on
one-half of the community estate; 10 (3) the income tax liability will
be the conventional one except that the wife will not have the income
from her one-half of the community estate except as it comes to her
from the trust; (4) the wife may be required to pay a gift tax in so far
307 RE.. ACT 1942 § 402; INTi. REv. CODE § 811(e) (2).
08 Note 503, upra.
509 Note 502, supra,
510 Note 503, supra.
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as her transfer of her one-half interest in the community estate is tor
the benefit of a person other than herself, such as children or third
persons who have rights under her husband's trust; 11 (5) if the trans-
fer is optional with her, she can then determine whether the gift tax
should be incurred or not. Indeed, even if it was neither mandatory
nor optional by virtue of the writing, she can transfer the property to
the trustee anyhow and incur the gift tax liabilities if it is to her inter-
est so to do. The practical consequences, both by way of advantage
and disadvantage, are the same as those under Plan A.
Under Plan B, if the wife dies first the tax consequences will be the
same as those under Plan A, and the practical consequences, both by
way of advantage and disadvantage, will be the same as those under
Plan A.
Under Plan C, if the husband dies first the tax consequences will be
as follows: (i) The tax consequences of this plan are the least favor-
able to the preservation of the estate. The executor (wife) must pay
the federal estate tax on the whole estate;512 the inheritance tax may
have to be paid on the whole estate, because the wife takes under the
will, not independently of it; 1 ' the income tax consequences are the
same as under Plan B where there is a mandatory transfer of her half
of the community estate to the trustee. The practical consequences,
both by way of advantage and disadvantage, are the same as those
under Plan A.
Under Plan C, if the wife dies first the tax consequences and prac-
tical consequences are the same as under Plan A.
Under Plan D, if the husband dies first the tax consequences will
be as follows: (i) The wife need not pay a gift tax on the transfer
of her half interest to the husband as a separate estate;5 14 (2) upon
the husband's death his estate must pay an estate tax on the whole of
the estate transferred by his wife to himself and upon the estate of the
community property; 1 ' (3) the inheritance tax must likewise be paid
51'1 INT. REv. CODE § 1000; Reg. No. 108, § 86.1, 2.
512 Note 502, supra.
518 See Falknor, Ltability of the Entire Community Estate for the Payment of
State Inheritance Tax Where Husband Undertakes to Dispose of Entire Communitv
Estate By Will and Wife Elects to Take Under the Will, 5 WASH. L. REv. 55
(1930). Contra, Pacific Nat'l Bank of Seattle, Extr. v. C. I. R., 40 B. T. A. 128
(1939). Since 1942 Amendment, INT. R v. CODE § 811(d) (e), entire community
property is taxable as part of husband's estate with the statutory exceptions noted
therein. The Washington law remains the same, however.
514 This is a peculiar consequence of INT. REv. CODE § 1000(d) making gifts of
community property gifts by the husband with certain exceptions.
515 Except to the extent shown to have been received as compensation for per-
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on the whole of the estate of the wife transferred to the husband as
well as on one-half of the community property; (4) the income tax
liability follows the conventional pattern, as in Plan B, where the
transfer to the trustee is mandatory The practical- consequences are
as follows: By way of advantage, (i) the advantages are the same as
under Plan A, with the further assurance in the husband that every-
thing has been done in his lifetime that was to be done after his death.
By way of disadvantage, (i) there are no practical disadvantages of
this plan, the disadvantages being purely taxwise.
Under Plan D, if the wife dies first the tax consequences will be as
follows: (i) There is no estate tax on the wife's interest because that
has been transferred to her husband, unless it be subject to the statute
taxing transfers in contemplation of death; (2) there is no inheritance
tax, unless it is a transfer in contemplation of death, (3) the income
tax follows the conventional pattern as in Plan A. The practical con-
sequences, both by way of advantage and disadvantage, will be the
same as those under Plan A.
d. CONCLUSIONS AS TO BSsT PLAN
It will be noted that in each of the plans unity of administration
and the preservation of the estate is safeguarded. However, the tax
consequences of the several plans differ. The most favorable plan,
from the standpoint of minmizing taxes, is Plan A. Plan B, with an
optional right of the wife to transfer her community estate to the
trustee, is, however, a desirable plan because of its greater practical
advantage in encouraging the wife to transfer her interest to the trus-
tee if she is prepared to pay the gift tax. Actually, the same arrange-
ment is possible under Plan A, the difference being merely that the
idea is not suggested by the husband in his lifetime, but is left for
suggestion to the trustee after his death. The matter might, however, be
covered by a letter of advice to the wife. Plan C may have expensive
tax consequences and achieves nothing greater than that which is
achieved by Plan A or Plan B. If the wife is cooperative, it is not as
desirable as Plan B, even when there is a mandatory requirement to
transfer the interest to the trustee, because Plan B does not entail the
tax consequences that Plan C entails. Plan D is not particularly desir-
able, especially if the husband dies first, because of the tax conse-
sonal services actually rendered by the wife or derived originally from such com-
pensation or from separate property of the wife. RE v. Acr 1942 § 402. It. re Neu-
mann, 9 T. C. 146 (1947), construes "compensation for personal services" of wife.
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quences, namely, a gift tax inter vzvos and his estate tax on the same
property upon the husband's death. Furthermore, the wife loses all
control over the half interest in the community property which she
had prior to the inter vevos transfer to her husband.
Taking everything into account, Plan A is the best all-around plan
to preserve the community estate after death. The plan may be varied
to meet the particular needs of the spouses involved, but its essential
outline should be retained.
VII. LAW REFORM IN ESTATE PLANNING
A. CRITERIA OF EXCELLENCE
Change in law is by no means synonymous with progress. Whether
change is progress depends on the answer to the question-progress
to what end? If the end is increased revenue, such an end could be
achieved by lowering or elirmnating tax exemptions and increasing
tax rates; or by rendering the use of trusts subject to an extra tax or
supplementary estate tax; or by taxing trust interests or future inter-
ests which would otherwise not now be taxable when such interests
fall into possession or enjoyment," or by supplementary succession
tax upon the recipient when he obtains possession, or by taxing all
powers of appointment without the exception applicable to familial
powers of appointment. On the other hand, if the end to be attained is
the transmission of the maximum estate to estate beneficiaries,"1 '
whether through inter vzvos, quasi-testamentary or testamentary trans-
fers, such an end can be accomplished by lowering tax rates, increasing
tax exemptions, or abolishing gift, inheritance, or estate taxes or por-
tions thereof. 18 Any of the changes above suggested are essentially de-
pendent on broad considerations of public policy and on the desirability
516 This is the law in Quebec, for example.
517 It has been pointed out that present income tax rates and succession tax
rates are so high as to encourage waste of capital and to discourage saving. Such
rates encourage spending because if the owner doesn't spend the estate, the taxing
jurisdictions involved will. As a source of revenue, the succession tax will probably
decline in importance as time goes on. See A TAX PROGRAM FOR A SOLVENT AMERICA
(1945) by the Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, p. 159 et seq., advocating alter-
natively high exemptions and stable, moderate rates with no taxation of bequests
to husband or wife of the testator.
518 It has been advocated by responsible sources that the federal government
withdraw from the field of federal estate and gift taxes. See A TAX PROGRAM FOR
A SOLVENT AMERICA (1945) by the Committee on Postwar Tax Policy, pp. 155-169.
The taxation of transfers at death was resorted to by the federal government as a
temporary war measure during the Civil War, Spanish-American War, and First
World War. After First World War Congress finally decided to retain the tax as
a permanent source of federal revenue. See A TAX PROGRAM FOR A SOLVENT
AMERICA, supra, pp. 155, et seq.
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of the ends to be achieved. It is obvious that some, though theoretically
possible, are practically impossible, and others are both desirable and
practicable. From the standpoint of the law of estate planning, how-
ever, our inquiry here must be limited to what is theoretically possible,
and also what is desirable and practicable within the reasonably near
future. 19
As to desirable reforms within practicable limits, the criteria of
excellence that should be considered require that law reforms sought
to be achieved be enacted by provisions that are provzdent, fair and
simple. To bring about law reform that complies with these criteria of
excellence, there are three classes of reform that might be considered,
and illustrative suggestions made with reference to each. (i) Reforms
dealing with local substantive law that should be operative in the
absence of a specific trust or testamentary provision to the contrary;
(2) reforms dealing with the elimnation of gift and estate transfer
tax inequities; (3) reforms seeking to simplify gift, income, and estate
transfer tax applications. Without attempting an exhaustive or detailed
consideration of possible reforms, but solely for the purpose of charting
the possible direction of needed reforms, let us consider each such
class further.
B. REFORMS DEALING WITH PROVIDENT SUBSTANTIVE LAW
It has become common practice in any carefully drawn inter vzvos
trust or will 2 to insert clauses in standard phraseology to meet usual
contingencies. Thus, it is usually provided that a will shall be , non-
intervention will;52' or that the surviving spouse named as personal
representative shall serve without bond;121 or that the trustee shall
have the broadest possible powers, including the power to allocate
income and principal; 2 or to divide the estate in kind; to invest as
519 See PAUL, Tawation for Prosperity, c. 37 ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES 308-316.
520 Cf. "Will" and "Codicil," Re Whittier's Estate, 26 Wn. (2d) 833, 176 P. (2d)
281 (1947), Comment, 22 WASH. L. REv. 204 (1947).52
, REM. REv. STAT. § 1462-4. The flexibility of such a will is apparent. The non-
intervention executor may determine the amount of family allowance. In re Guye's
Estate, 63 Wash. 167, 114 Pac. 1041 (1911). He may convey real estate for admims-
tration purposes. Fulmer v. Gable, 73 Wash. 684, 132 Pac. 641 (1913). He may
act on creditors' claims without court approval. Schubach v. Redelsheimer, 92
Wash. 124, 158 Pac. 739 (1916). He may operate a business to pay bequests. it re
Elvigen's Estate, 191 Wash. 614, 71 P. (2d) 672 (1937). No final decree is neces-
sary. Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 Pac. 265 (1930). As to matters of
which he is in doubt, he can submit to the court. State ex rel. Jakobsen v. Superior
Court, 127 Wash. 583, 221 Pac. 608 (1923),
522 REM. REv. STAT. §§ 1437, 1439, 1457
525 WASH. LAWS 1947, c. 160 provides for allocation in absence of contrary pro-
vision of trust or other instrument.
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prudence requres;"24 to retain as trust assets the business interest of
deceased at the date of death; 2 ' to purchase common stock;" 6 to
compromise claims; to lend money to the estate; to carry trust securi-
ties in the name of nomnnees; -7 and, in general, to give the trustee
powers as broad as those enjoyed by the testator in his lifetime. Again,
it is a common practice to insert a spendthrift clause in a testamentary
trust or to provide protection against the operation of the rule against
perpetuities by making the bequest valid up to the expiration of the
permitted perpetuity period, or to provide that specific or demonstra-
tive legacies shall be free of inheritance or other succession tax. 23 If
provisions such as these mentioned are deemed so beneficial that they
are usually inserted for the protection of the testator, his estate, and
estate beneficiaries, would it not be helpful to provide by statute that
in the absence of a trust or testamentary provision to the contrary,
provisions such as those above mentioned would be implied?
Analogies are helpful. Thus the Business Corporation Act in Wash-
ington contains many provisions that operate in the absence of a per-
missible charter or by-law provision to the contrary " ' and that for-
merly were required to be embodied in the corporate by-laws if the
corporation was to enjoy the protection of such provisions. Statutory
deeds in Washington are deemed to contain certain covenants unless
otherwise stated in the instrument." '0 Trustees' investment powers,
embodying the "prudent man" rule, govern unless otherwise stated in
the trust instrument. 31 The duty to account under the x941 Trustees'
Accounting Act exists unless otherwise stated. "2 The power of a fiduci-
ary to allocate to income or principal corporate dividends received
524The prudent man rule in fiduciary investments is now embodied in WASH.
LAWS 1947, c. 100.
525 The business interest might not be an eligible investment nor its retention
prudent, yet its retention might be very important to the deceased's family.
528 But for the prudent man rule, common stocks are ordinarily improper invest-
ment of trust funds. See NOSSAMAN, TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION 511,
§ 459.
527 Trust Companies may hold securities in name of nominee. WASH. LAWS
1947, c. 146.
52S But for such provision, the legatee must pay inheritance tax, REm. REv.
STAT. §§ 11208, 11209, 11202-1 (n), 1 (o). If it is intended to have the residuary estate
pay inheritance taxes on inter vivos transfers such as transfers in contemplation of
death the will should clearly so provide as by requiring payment of inheritance
taxes payable "by reason of my death."
520 Id. § 3803-61.
530 Id. §§ 10552-3, 4. See also REM. REv. STAT. § 10555 (mortgages).
531 WASH. LAWS 1947, c. 100.
552Id. c. 229. REm. REv. STAT. §§ 11548-1 to 28 is inapplicable, however, to
executors, administrators and guardians.
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exists unless otherwise provided.83 The power of a fiduciary to carry
securities in the name of a nominee exists unless otherwise provided.3"
Even the statute governing wills embodies many provisions that apply
unless otherwise stated in the testator's will."3 ' Analogies such as those
above mentioned suggest the advisability of extending the application
of the principles embodied in the analogies to the end that provisions
which practice has found beneficial should be deemed inserted or
implied in a will or trust unless there is specific provision to the
contrary
C. REFORMS DEALING WITH THE ELIMINATION OF GIFT AND
ESTATE TRANSFER TAX INEQUITIES
Gift and estate transfer tax tends to embody the principle of caveat
testator or caveat donor or caveat taxpayer. This is a decided change
from the common law rule that tax statutes are construed strictly
against the taxing authority and in favor of the taxpayer."3 ' Perhaps
it has been necessary to depart from the common law rule because of
the ingenuity displayed by taxpayers in so casting their affairs as to
minimize tax liability However, if this be the reason, then it circum-
scribes with increasing force the principle enunciated by the federal
courts that there is nothing either legally or morally wrong in a tax-
payer so arranging Ins affairs as to minimize tax liability "I It is prob-
ably too late to expect a legislative restoration of the common law rule
of strict construction in favor of the taxpayer, and it is probably im-
possible to enact legislation that will eliminate the doctrine of caveat
taxpayer which now exists. It must be left to the courts, however, to
exercise a sound discretion in so interpreting tax statutes as not to
lead the taxpayer to feel that he has been unjustly treated and unjustly
hindered in the realization of his normal and reasonably grounded
expectations. Even more important is the necessity of emphasizing this
approach upon administrative officials charged with the administration
r'8 WASH. LAWS 1947, c. 160.
5341d. c. 146 applicable to trust companies.
535 E.g. REm. REV. STAT. § 1396 (interest on devises), § 1399 (revocation by subse-
quent marriage), § 1402 (intestacy as to unnamed child), § 1404 (death of devisee
before testator). See also §§ 1405, 1409, 1411.
536 Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151 (1917). However, tax exemption statutes
are strictly construed. Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662
(1902). In general see 3 C. C. H., FED. TAx REP. § 1874 and annotations thereto.537 See PAUL, STUDrES IN F ERAL TAXATION, Restatement of Tar Avoidance,
86, 105. E.g. C. I. R. v. Eldridge, 79 F(2d) 629 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), Fulton Oil Co.
v. C. I. R., 81 F.(2d) 330 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), United States v. Isham, 17 Wall.
496, 21 L. Ed. 728 (1873), Gregory v. Helvermg, 293 U. S. 465 (1935), Chisholm v.
C. I. R., 79 F.(2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
of the tax system. The unwillingness of administrative officials who
deal with taxpayers to take responsibility and to make decisions em-
bodying considerations of equity has long been a complaint of attor-
neys charged with the responsibility of dealing with such officials in
the administration of tax matters. Tax statutes are undoubtedly tech-
nical, but the rigidity with which such statutes are administered should
be tempered by considerations of fairness. These are matters which.
can hardly be enacted into legislation, but it should be taken into
account in judicial and administrative enforcement." 8
In most trusts the trustee is given power to invade the corpus for
the benefit of a beneficiary, who is frequently a spouse or child of the
testator. If the spouse is both trustee and beneficiary the power ot
such a spouse to invade the corpus is, as above pointed out, treated
as a taxable power of appointment."3 9 Such a provision has justly
caused much criticism, as an unnecessary restriction upon a perfectly
proper provision for the protection of the surviving spouse or child.
Often the power is not used and yet the existence of the power operates
to involve estate taxation of the property subject to the power upon the
death of the beneficiary Furthermore, by taxing the right to invade
the corpus, it is no longer provident for a testator to leave his estate
to his wife for life and the balance to their children,... because the
right of the wife to consume is a taxable power of appointment."' As
the law now stands, it is possible, by trust provision, to eliminate the
right to invade corpus as a taxable power of appointment, but it is not
possible to do so where a legal life estate and remainder exists. " 2 In
588 See PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, Restatement of the Law of Tax
Avosdance.
589 Reg. No. 105, § 81.24(b) (1).
540 See McLucas, Tax Statuw of Powers of Appotntmnent. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
MAGAZINE (Sept. 1944) makes a number of suggestions (including the one dis-
cussed) in three principal respects (1) Making the federal statute prospective only
in operation, (2) making the test of taxation or exemption dependent on the
persons who receive the property subject to the power rather than dependent upon
the persons in whose favor the power may be exercised, and (3) exclusion of
certain pre-existing powers as taxable powers of appointment, including power to
invade trust corpus. A life estate with remainder over with power in life tenant
to consume the estate is a valid estate for local law purposes. Porter v. Wheeler,
131 Wash. 482, 230 Pac. 640 (1924), In re Eckert's Estate, 14 Wn.(2d) 497, 128
P.(2d) 656 (1922), In re Goochnour's Estate, 192 Wash. 92, 72 P.(2d) 1027 (1937),
holding remainder not subject to inheritance tax upon death of life tenant. See
Annotation 36 A. L. R. 1180; 76 A. L. R. 1154.
51 Prior to the statute taxing the right of a beneficiary to invade corpus as a
taxable power of appointment, no federal tax was incurred in a life estate followed
by a remainder, the life tenant having power to consume. Royce v. C. I. R., 46
B. T. A. 1090 (1942), Davis v. U. S., 27 Fed. Supp. 698 (1939), Frew v. Bowers,
12 F.(2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1926).
542 See Myrtle Mercer v. C. I. R., T. C. Docket No. 9400 decided 9/23/46. Cf.
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consequence, it is necessary to pay a trustee for the privilege of exer-
cising the right to invade the corpus which, under a properly drawn
trust, would not be taxable. The whole subject of taxing powers of
appointment is now being studied in Congress with a view to revision.
More important than either of the tax inequities so far discussed is
the discriminatory treatment of gifts and testamentary transfers of
community property Under the federal law, the local law treatment
of community property, giving the spouses equal and vested interests
in community property, are ignored. Thus, upon the death of either
spouse leaving community property, the entire community estate is
taxed except such part thereof as can be shown to have been derived
from amounts received by the survivor as compensation for personal
services actually rendered or from such spouse's separate property,
provided that one-half in any case of such community property is
taxable. 43 The same theory is carried out in connection with inter
vzvos transfers."4 In common law jurisdictions where the wife does not
have a vested interest, it is understandable that any contingent interest
that she may have in common law marital property should be ignored;
consequently, upon her death, there is nothing to tax, and upon her
husband's death the whole estate is taxed. 45 But in view of the fact
that under the local law the wife has a present vested interest, it is
difficult to justify the taxation of community property as if that interest
were nothing more than a contingent interest owned by a wife in a
common law state. There is also a practical injustice resulting from
the operation of the statute. A husband normally earns the community
estate; the community estate normally does not result from the per-
sonal services actually rendered by the wife. Consequently, upon the
death of the husband, the wife must pay a tax upon the entire com-
munity estate; but upon the death of the wife, the husband need pay a
tax only on one-half of the community estate. The result of this is
McCauley v. C. I. R., 44 F.(2d) 919 (CCA 5th 1930), Conclo v. C. I. R., 41 B.T.A.
713 (1940), Fleischhmann v. C. I. R., 40 B.T.A. 672 (1939).
54sSee Fernandes v. Wiener, 326 U. S. 340 (1945), upholding INT. REV. CODE
§ 811(e). United States v. Rompel, 326 U. S. 367 (1945). See Neumann, 9 T. C.
146 (1947), as to meaning of "compensation for personal services" of wife. As
illustrative of the surviving spouse's burden of proof see Estate of Heidt, 8 T. C.
111 (1947), involving jointly held community property. If decedent returned income
as community income for income tax purposes, his personal representative may be
estopped to treat the property as separate for estate tax purposes. Estate of King-
don, 9 T. C. Il (1947).
544 INT. RIv. CODE § 1000(d), Reg. No. 108, § 862(c). Similarly for transfers in
contemplation of death. 26 U. S. C. A. § 811(c) (d) (f).545 See RABIN & JoHNsoN, FED. INc. GrFt & ESTATE TAXATION" 931, 903 et seq.
The test is that provided by local law- Whose property is it?
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
that the wife, who normally does not have much earning power, must
pay a tax at least twice as much as that payable by the husband who
normally continues to have earning power. This practical inequity
should be eliminated from our taxing scheme. In addition, under the
present federal gift tax law, gifts of community property are deemed
made by the husband." ' Consequently, a gift by the wife of her com-
munity interest to the husband, whether made rnter vsvos or in con-
templation of death, would seem to be tax-free. 4 While such a provi-
sion frees taxpayers, it is not a fair provision. If transfers are to be
taxed, there is no more reason for excluding that type of transfer than
there would be to exclude any other. It is of interest to note that the
section of taxation of the American Bar Association has recently pre-
pared a draft of a bill to repeal the 1942 federal estate and gift tax
amendments as a part of a plan to equalize taxes as between com-
munity property and common law states. Furthermore, the "Report
of the Special Tax Study Committee to the Committee on Ways and
Means" of the House has recommended that no estate tax be imposed
on what is legally the wife's community share and that for estate tax
purposes all property left outright by one spouse to another up to
one-half of his estate be exempted from estate tax. 4'
D. REFORM SEEKING TO SIMPLIFY GIFT, INCOME AND ESTATE
TRANSFER TAX APPLICATIONS
It has long been a criticism of federal excise tax structure that gift.
estate, and income taxes are not correlated. 4 The result, for example,
is that a transfer taxable as a gift may still result in income tax liability
on the subject of the gift to the donor,"' and that a transfer taxable
as a gift is nevertheless includible in the estate of the donor for estate
tax purposes.5 ' Anyone making a gift in trust must carefully thread
546 INT. REV. CODE § 1000(d), Reg. No. 108, § 86.2(c), see also § 811(d) (5). See
Francis, 8 T. C. 91 (1947), upholding constitutionality of INr. REv. CODE § 1000(d).
547 Cf. REM. REv. STAT. § 11218-11(b). No such exception exists under Wash-
ington Gift Tax Law. The "Report of the Special Tax Study Committee to the
Committee on Ways and Means" of the House recommends that for gift tax pur-
poses one half of any transfers between husband and wife be exempted from the
gift tax. 25 TAxEs 1048 (1947).
548 25 TAXES 1048 (1947).
549 See e.g. Erwin N. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of Income, Estate
and Gift Tax Prozssons with/ Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARV.
L. REv. 337 (1942), Eisenstem, Moderiussng Estate and Gift Taxes. 24 TAXES 870
(1946).
550 E.g. Helverng v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940).
581 E.g. Gifts with possibility of reverter. See Note 261, supra. In the joint study
issued September 10, 1947, prepared by the Treasury Department entitled "Federal
Estate and Gift Taxes-A Proposal for Integration and for Correlation with the
Income Tax" approximately nine instances of transfers incomplete or possibly
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his way through a labyrinth of statutes and regulations in an effort to
assure himself that the gift is a gift for estate and income tax purposes
as well as one for gift tax purposes.""
There is no reason for the continuance of such a state of the law
It is unfair, and unnecessarily complicated, to require a taxpayer to
treat a transfer as subject to a gift tax and at the same time as subject
to income tax or estate tax. The taxing scheme should correlate these
three taxes so that a transfer subject to a gift tax is really and truly
to be treated as a gift so that there will be no income tax payable on
the subject of the gift and the gift subject matter not includible in the
donor's estate. '
It will also be noted from what has heretofore been said that a tax-
payer engaged in planning an estate must take into consideration at
least two separate systems of taxation-state and federal. Transfers
that are gifts under local law may or may not be gifts under federal
law ' Transfers that are subject to exemptions under federal law
may or may not be subject to similar exemptions under state law "
The taxing scheme of taxing the recipient under state law is quite
different from the taxing scheme of taxing the transferor under federal
law The result is that the state and federal taxes are not coordinated
or correlated, when they might well be.
In addition, the concept of transfers in contemplation of death or
transfers to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death is
an extremely difficult concept to work with in practice. If, therefore, a
taxing scheme can be devised that will tax donative transfers and yet
eliminate the necessity of utilizing the concept of transfers in con-
templation of death or transfers to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after death, the taxing scheme will be considerably sim-
plified.5
58
Reforms have been suggested from time to time as to changing our
taxing scheme. A well thought-out plan is the so-called "Accession
Tax," which is "a progressive tax on each recipient of money or other
incomplete for estate tax purposes but complete for income tax purposes, and eight
transfers complete for estate tax purposes but incomplete or possibly incomplete for
income tax purposes, are mentioned.552 See discussion =Pra, under heading "Gifts with Permissible Stnngs."
558 Note 549, supra. See PAuL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY, 309, et seq. Such is
the relief sought by the Treasury Department's proposal referred to in Note 551,
supra.
54 The statutory definitions are not the same. Cf. REM. Rv. STAT. § 11218-11
with IxT. REv. CODE §§ 1000 1002.
• Cf. REM. Rzv. STAT. § 11218-12, 14, 15 with INT. REv. CODE §§ 1003, 1004.
55 This is advocated inter alia, PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY, 309, et seq.
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property by way of inheritance or znter vwvos gift" according to the
aggregate taxable acquisitions of the donee, no matter from whom. '
Another plan embodying the present federal transfer tax theory of
taxing the donor or transferor is the plan of imposing a single transfer
tax on the donor of donative transfers, whether before or after death,
with a single exemption. The latter plan is probably the more easily
adopted because involving a less substantial departure from the present
federal taxing scheme."'
Aware of the need of reform, the Treasury Department, after a
three-year study, has issued a pamphlet entitled "Federal Estate and
Gift Taxes-A Proposal for Integration and for Correlation with the
Income Tax" (September io, 1947) The study appraises critically
the existing federal estate, gift, and income tax structures. "'
The Treasury Department then recommends that the federal estate
and gift taxes be integrated into a single transfer tax and that this tax
in turn be correlated with the income tax so that the transferor's in-
come tax liability ceases once the transfer tax is imposed. Integration
is accomplished by utilizing the cumulative basis of computation used
in the present federal gift tax statutes. Accordingly dispositions ef-
fected at death would be the final transfer taxable at a rate deter-
mined by adding the property transferred at death to the property
transferred during life and subject to tax at that time. In addition,
there would be a single exemption, regardless of whether the transfer
was rater vzvos or at death. Thus, using the present exemptions as
illustrative, at death the decedent's estate would be entitled to an ex-
emption of $6o,ooo, plus any unused balance of the present $30,000
lifetime exemption allowed for inter vvos transfers. As for annual
exclusions, while it is suggested that they be put on a per donor basis
(regardless of whether a future interest is created) rather than as at
present on a per donee basis with an annual $3,000 exclusion (except
for future interests), there is no objection raised to a continuance of a
per donee basis in an amount to be fixed by Congress.
As for correlation with the federal income tax, the method proposed
is this: The income tax will generally continue to be imposed upon
557 Rudick, A Proposal for an Accesssons Tax, 1 TAX L. REv. 25 (1945).558 See Eisenstem, Are We Ready for Estate and Gift Tax Revssson? 25 TAXES
316 (1947), PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERITY, 314.
059 The Treasury Department recommends a single transfer tax on all donative
transfers whether before or after death. See Note 551, supra. The Report is sum-
marized in 25 TAXES 955 (1947) Platt. Ihtegration and Correlaton--The Treasur,
Proposal, 3, TAX L. REv. 59 (1947).
ESTATE PLANNING
the transferor of property until he has relinquished sufficient controls
or contacts to render the transfer complete, whereupon the income tax
ceases. If, however, there is an incomplete transfer in trust, the gran-
tor's liability for income tax is to be accompanied by a right to recap-
ture from the trustee part of the trust income taxable to the grantor,
to the end that the grantor may be reimbursed-for the most part, at
least-for the tax which he is required to pay on income which the
trust, but not he, receives.
If adopted, the proposal will not only correlate estate, gift, and
income taxes, it will also do away with contemplation of death prob-
lems and transfer tax advantages in cases of inter vzvos gifts. The
advantage of inter vzvos trusts with respect to the nontaxability of
remainders on the death of a life tenant would remain; it would still
be advisable to make gifts to split income, with features of certainty
added ,as to what is a completed transfer and with provisions for tax
reimbursement in cases of gifts in trust the income of which is taxable
to the trustor. It is to be noted, however, that the present estate and
gift tax treatment of community property is to be retained, and is not
to be correlated with income tax treatment of community property
The reason for not correlating these taxes, according to the Treasury
Department, is to impose substantially similar burdens on jointly held
and community property There can be little question that the pro-
posed transfer tax integrated with income tax (even if only to the
extent proposed) will be a decided improvement over the present law
The state of Washington, in the interest of simplicity and for
the purpose of correlating its inheritance tax with the estate tax of the
federal government, might adopt the federal system of taxing the right
to transmit property (rather than the right to receive property). The
state might then provide that whenever a federal estate or gift tax is
payable, the state shall receive a percentage of such tax."' To take
into account relationship of the beneficiaries, specific additional deduc-
tions or exemptions can be provided. As to transfers too small to be
subject to federal legislation, the state may fix rates on an equitable
basis embodying the theory of taxing the right to transmit with appro-
priate deductions and exemptions based on relationship of donor and
donee or testator and beneficiary The merit of the plan suggested is
its relative simplicity, namely, a single donative transfer tax adopted
for the benefit of both state and federal governments, the time of the
500 REM. REv. STAT. §§ 11202-1 (1) and 11202-b as analogies.
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transfer (i.e., before or after death) for purposes of exemptions allow-
able being less important."'
CONCLUSION
The foregoing review of the problems of estate planning shows that
the attorney's obligation is not necessarily discharged by drawing a
will as requested by a client. If the testator is to succeed in transmit-
ting in as provident and economical a manner as possible the estate he
owns, it is necessary to understand and consider (i) the nature of the
individual and marital property involved; (2) the tax effect, both state
and federal, of transfers proposed both inter vzvos and testamentary;
(3) the use of life insurance, both personal and business, in connection
with the plan, (4) social security benefits, if any; (5) the substantive
testamentary provisions, including possible trust transfers; (6) the
problem of unitary management in the case of community property;
and (7) an assessment of possible or probable law changes as it may
affect the plan used.
In addition to the needs of the particular client, and from the stand-
point of helping to guide the direction of estate planning law reform,
an attorney will want to do what he can to influence such law reform
in the direction of securing the enactment of statutes that will achieve
the proper objectives of such law reform, namely, providence, fairness,
and simplicity
561 In A TAX PROGRAM FOR A SOLVENT AMERICA, 232 et seq., proposals for dealinp
with overlapping taxes are discussed under the following headings (1) separation
of sources, (2) shared taxes, (3) state and local supplements to federal taxes,
(4) credit for state tax against Federal tax, (5) grants in aid. The methods (3)
and (4) are disapproved as a threat to the fiscal independence of states and as not
eliminating the necessity of duplicate returns. It is submitted that fiscal independence
of the state will not be impaired under the proposal here made and that the state
return and audit problems attendant thereon for state purposes will be much
simplified.
